Antitrust revolution free download

Privacy Copyright. Authors Christopher S. Abstract A symposium examining the contributions of the post-Chicago School provides an appropriate opportunity to offer some thoughts on both the past and the future of antitrust.

Publication Citation U. Licensing Standard-Essential Patents: Microsoft v. Motorola Howard H. Chang Richard Schmalensee Leffler Cristian J. Santesteban Northwest Airlines Kenneth G. Elzinga David E. Retail Auto Sales: Tesla v. Rogerson Steven Olley Robert Town Cartel Ringmaster or Competition Creator?

Baker Gilbert Maintenance of Monopoly: U. Microsoft Daniel L. John E. Kwoka is Neal F. He is the author or editor of three books and more than 75 articles in the areas of industrial economics, antitrust, and regulation. Policy was published by MIT Press in Lawrence J. His primary areas of research interest include financial regulation, antitrust, network industries, international banking, and applied microeconomics. Public Policy toward Network Industries The examples are relevant and fun for students to read.

It allows faculty to teach an antitrust class at different levels and has a real-world perspective that most economics textbooks lack. The additional rulemaking recommendations relate to unfair data collection and surveillance that may harm competition, restrictions by manufacturers that prevent farmers from repairing their own equipment; agreements to delay market entry in the pharmaceutical industry by generic and biosimilar suppliers, unfair competition in the Internet marketplace, unfair occupational licensing restrictions, and unfair tying and exclusionary practices in real estate brokerage.

The Executive Order suggests that the President is in a hurry to intensify competition across U. Perhaps the most important question is how much the DOJ and the FTC can accomplish over the next year or even over the next decade. The FTC made a similar effort to push the frontiers of antitrust and consumer protection enforcement in the s. The ground was littered with failures.

Commissioner Wilson did not report on the setbacks the FTC suffered on the competition side during that era. They are worth revisiting. The commission instituted two shared monopoly test cases, one against oil companies and another against cereal companies. Neither was successful. After a series of such decisions, the FTC pulled back and, at least in our memory, has not rendered any judgment in administrative litigation that relied exclusively on an expansive reading of the antitrust provision in Section 5.

In , the commission announced a narrow scope for its powers under Section 5. They propose using competitive rulemaking under two circumstances. First, if there is an extensive enforcement record, they propose using a rule to cut off never-ending litigation.

They offer pay-for-delay or reverse payments in Hatch-Waxman settlements as an example. The second circumstance is one in which private litigants are unlikely to challenge the anticompetitive conduct. They offer, as an example, non-compete clauses in employment contracts. They explain that there is no private litigation in this area because employers include forced arbitration clauses and class action waivers in employment contracts.

Not surprisingly, the Executive Order encourages the FTC to make rules covering both of these examples. Can the commission abandon the rule of reason when making competition rules? Is a rule justified if the anticompetitive effects do not outweigh the procompetitive effects? Consider a large, well-known fast-food chain that has such non-compete clauses.

The clauses are vertical in nature because they are between the franchisor or franchisee and its employees, and not between competitors. In such a circumstance, the first step a plaintiff would have to take is to prove that the employer has market power. But even if the plaintiff or the commission satisfies its burden of proof in the first step, the respondent or defendant can attempt to justify its restraint on efficiency grounds.

In this case, the respondent would likely assert that it invested in training the employee and the investment would be lost if the employee could be readily poached.